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At the heart of capitalism lies an apparent contradiction between cultural liberalism and 
traditional moral authority. This contradiction was spelled out by Friedrich Hayek in The 
Constitution of Liberty “the individual should be able to transgress them [the rules] when it 
seems to him worthwhile”, the individual needs to be able to produce new modes of 
thought and ways of seeing challenging conventional opinion and authority allows the 
market to function. On the other hand, “the general observance of these conventions 
[traditions] is a necessary condition of the orderliness of the world in which we live” 
(Hayek, 2011: 123). According to Philip Mirowski this moral question is something that 
puzzled what he calls “the neoliberal thought collective” from the beginning. Hayek 
brought it up at the first meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 saying that “I am 
convinced that unless the breach between true liberal and religious convictions can be 
healed, there is no hope for a revival of liberal forces” (quoted in Mirowski, 2013: 66).  
Irwin Stelzer has claimed that the enduring economic legacy of neoconservatism regards a 
loosening attitude toward deficit spending (Stelzer, 2004, 194), this, I will argue is only part 
of it. David Harvey has described neoconservatism as neoliberalism’s moral support 
(Harvey, 2005: 82), in this paper I will develop this thought and show how the 
neoconservative moral discourse has established a moral legitimation that is central to 
neoliberalism and the overcoming of what Hirst has described “modernity’s abyss” (Hirst, 
2012) . By overcoming and co-opting aspects of the bohemian attitude, neoliberalism 
established new moral codes based on risk, flexibility the creativity of the individual and 
the will to embrace chance. It is the stabilisation of this moral economy that, along with 
intellectual capture of the economic establishment (Mirowski, 2013) and the side-lining of 
heterodox economic thinking (Keen, 2011), has enabled neoliberalism to survive. 
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This paper is structure around reading of three writers. Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol 
and George Gilder have all been significant voices in what is broadly defined as 
neoconservatism and each, I will argue, builds on and responds to the critiques of each 
other. My focus will be on the neoconservative response what is perceived as the malaise 
and nihilism of liberal modernity, particularly as it appears through bohemianism and the 
counter-culture and then through capitalism.  
How does this relate to neoliberalism? The consumer capitalist economy relies upon the 
breaking down of cultural boundaries in order to create new markets. This homology 
between economic and cultural liberalism is key to the understanding of neoliberalism. 
The freedom that is offered to the individual in terms of thought and lifestyle is mirrored 
in the freedom that the market has to exploit these opportunities. This means that what 
begins as a critique of bohemia and the counter-culture for Podhoretz and Kristol 
necessarily developed in into a critique of capitalism. Capitalism is attacked in the same 
terms as the counter-culture, it is accused of being nihilistic and of producing a cultural 
and moral malaise that ultimately undermines political order. 
However, the neoconservative programme developed a contradiction because although 
the cultural negativity of bohemia was rejected the same approach was not taken to 
capitalism. Indeed, Kristol’s critique is meant as a warning so that capitalism can protect 
itself from itself. The question then becomes the one that troubled Hayek, how can a 
moral order be restored into a necessarily amoral system? How do you construct a moral 
order within an economic system that rejects boundedness? Furthermore, how does 
capitalism legitimate itself in the face of what Hayek called “the game of catallaxy”? This 
game presents the problem in which “differences in rewards… will be based partly on 
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achievement and partly on mere chance” (Hayek, 1982: 74). Success in a market economy 
can very often be based on chance and what used to be known as “freaks of fortune” 
(Levy, 2013), how, in this situation can there be justice? 
At this point commentators have often turned towards neoconservative foreign policy. 
Foreign policy presents a sphere where a black and white code can be re-imposed (Drolet, 
2013; Hommolar, 2010; Hirst, 2012; Halper and Clarke, 2004). I would not dispute these 
claims and they are well supported by neoconservatives themselves (Kristol and Kagan, 
1996). My question is different, I am interested in how neoliberalism attempted to 
overcome moral emptiness and produced its own moral code. By understanding the moral 
economy of neoliberalism and appreciating its particular form of moral seduction we can 
better understand the apparent steadfastness after the total systemic crisis that 
manifested in 2007/8.     
My central claim is that the response to the neoconservative critique of bohemian and 
capitalist morality in liberal modernity has been to subsume that bohemian negativity. 
Neoliberal morality internalised negativity and the counter-culture in the creation of a 
moral economy based on risk and the willingness to embrace chance. Risk and chance 
offer the individual a form of neoliberal seduction whilst also justifying the massive 
inequality generated through the deregulated economy. By understanding the seduction 
we can understand the appeal that neoliberalism seems to hold. Understanding the 
seduction is of course not the same as falling for it. The financial system is more interested 
in the avoidance of risk than the existential benefits gained through embracing it. Risk is 
displaced through financial instruments such as insurance and personal risk is often 
removed from the financial players, subprime mortgages and the resulting Collateralised 
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Debt Obligations being only the most notorious example. Real risk is imposed upon those 
at the bottom where the existential joy of life on the edge is less noticeable.  
The first part of this paper will consider the neoconservative reaction to the Beat writers. 
The neoconservative reaction, exemplified here through the writings of Norman 
Podhoretz, will be contextualised through a longer historical view of bohemia as a 
response to the rationalising logic of bourgeois modernity. The second part, focusing on 
Irving Kristol, will show how this critique of literary bohemianism developed into an attack 
on the counter-culture and then capitalism. The third part of this paper shows how, in light 
of the critique of bohemian and capitalist amorality produced by neoconservatives, 
George Gilder proposed a new form of capitalist morality based on risk and the willingness 
to accept chance. Existentially Gilder’s presentation of capitalist risk mirrors that found in 
earlier bohemian critiques of the safe world of bourgeois modernity. The paper concludes 
by noting the misrepresentation of capitalist risk in Gilder’s work, capitalism is not 
irrational like he claims and does not embrace risk and chance as ends in themselves. 
However, despite this, Gilder’s argument still contains a seductive value that is key to 
understanding the legitimation of the contemporary situation of the neoliberal subject.  
 
 
Podhoretz on the Beat(s)  
In 2004 George W. Bush presented the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Norman 
Podhoretz. Podhoretz had been the editor in chief of the neoconservative journal 
Commentary from 1960 until his retirement in 1995 and in 1997 and was a signatory of the 
statement of principles of the Project for the New American Century, a think-tank that 
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advocated the neo-imperialist foreign policy that dominated the two presidential terms of 
the younger Bush.  
However, in 1946 the first person to publish Podhoretz was Allen Ginsberg in the Columbia 
Poetry Review (which Ginsberg was then the editor of). Later, in 1956 when Podhoretz was 
gaining a reputation as a literary critic, Ginsberg felt confident enough in his tastes to send 
him a copy of Howl for review. Podhoretz did not review Ginsberg’s seminal work but did 
go on to publish uncomplimentary essays on the Beat generation.  
In ‘The Know Nothing Bohemians’, Podhoretz makes a distinction between the earlier 
bohemianism of the 1920s (Hemingway and Fitzgerald) and that of the Beats. Kerouac 
“seems to feel that respectability is a sign not of moral corruption but of spiritual death” 
(2004: 31). There was no political reason for On the Road, whereas earlier bohemianism 
“represented a repudiation of the provinciality, philistinism and moral hypocrisy of 
American life” (2004: 31). Kerouac was interested in pure experience as an end in itself, 
the only possible end, whereas earlier bohemianism “was a movement created in the 
name of civilisation: its ideals were intelligence, cultivation, spiritual refinement.” (2004: 
31) The indifference of the Beats to politics seems to be their great crime for Podhoretz, 
they rejected civilisation and “worship primitivism, instinct, energy, blood. To the extent 
that [they have] intellectual interests at all, they run to mystical doctrines [and] 
irrationalist philosophies.” (2004: 32) 
The idea of bohemia developed in mid-nineteenth century France as a reaction against 
encroaching modernity, for Daniel Cottom it “was a dramatic exception to the drive 
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toward the disciplinary organisation of power… identified with the modern state.” (2013: 
227) Bohemia was a revolt against the rationalising tendency of modernity, especially 
regarding work. Following Hegel’s identification of the master/slave dialectic, work in 
modernity became associated with spirit. In Hegel’s dialectic it is the labouring slave who 
recognises him/herself through work whilst the master stagnates. No-longer seen as 
punishment, the work of the rising bourgeoisie began to be internalised as a culture that 
increasingly “appeared as a moral virtue” (Cottom, 2013: 79).  
The internalisation of work as culture was accompanied by increase in the level of 
education for the children of the new middle classes. However, these young men were 
“disabled by education” (Cottom, 2013: 76). The critical education that they received 
encouraged them to reject the work of their parents. The rejection of bourgeois values 
constituted the look and attitude of French bohemia that took on aristocratic airs whilst 
revelling in chosen penury. Though characterised and mocked as mere laziness, bohemia 
was concerned with the production of community away from “the house, out from under 
the father, and even, in a sense, out of the capitalist marketplace and modern nation.” 
(Cottom, 2013: 114). Bohemia sought a new transnational community unbounded by 
traditional sources of authority and control.  
However, there was a vagueness to bohemian identity. One was not born a bohemian, the 
identity was taken on by the subject. Bohemian identity lacked a doctrine or any form of 
codified practice. This vagueness freed bohemians to experiment with forms of life that 
were radically un-codified but also opened bohemianism up to the sham of the poseur, 
“the bohemian is artificial through and through” (Cottom, 2013: 11). The bohemian 
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identity is a pretence and a performance, as an attitude it is a reaction against modernity 
and born of modernity, yet it was reliant upon the middleclass safety net in which it 
developed.  
The vagueness of bohemia also constituted its international aspect. For example, the 
bohemia that developed in nineteenth century France was not the same as that which 
developed in America. Contrary to the French bohemians’ search for the outside as rebels, 
“In America… bohemia positively desired respectability” (Cottom, 2013: 161) American 
bohemians were broad, free-thinkers and supporters of the nation, religion and 
respectability, not the wild children of the French middleclass. For Walt Whitman, 
“democracy, individualism, nationalism, spiritual identity, manliness, moral decency and 
tolerance” characterised the “patriotic cosmopolitism” (Cottom, 2013: 164) of American 
bohemia. Citing ‘manliness’ as a feature of American bohemianism is important in light of 
recent work by Harvey C. Mansfield, the Straussian neoconservative. For Mansfield, “The 
manly man is in control when control is difficult or contested – in a situation of risk” (2006: 
16). Authors, such as Ernest Hemingway, are used illustrate the lost figure who is key to 
the establishment of “authority” (Mansfield, 2006: 17). For Mansfield the collapse of 
manliness in the “gender neutral” society is a manifestation of the nihilism of modernity. 
Mansfield is not a lone neoconservative in these concerns, George Gilder posed a similar 
problem in his 1986 book Men and Marriage. A recuperation of some form of manliness 
seems to be an important part of the neoconservative programme, it is key to the 
supposed moral qualities of foreign policy and also to the moral economy of risk that 
Gilder will attempt to establish.       
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It is respectability that Podhoretz saw in the cosmopolitan, but not threatening, 
bohemianism of the 1920s. If bohemianism is understood as a particular response to 
modernity, this American variation should be understood as particular to American 
modernity. Unlike its European cousins it did not evolve inside the aristocratic order; 
American modernity established itself anew. Without an aristocracy to mock, in a land still 
being discovered and with opportunity and adventure available at the frontier, American 
modernity of the nineteenth-century was a long way from Europe. However, the 
respectable and corporatist atmosphere of the US in the nineteen-fifties was a long way 
from the nineteenth century. The frontier had closed and the freedom that expansion gave 
had been replaced by Fordist production, Taylorist organisation and the consumer society; 
the two Beats were rebelling against this world (Holton, 2004: 12-13). Influenced as much 
by Baudelaire and Rimbaud, the surrealists and Andre Gide, as they were by American 
writers, the Beats fused together the contrasting reactions to modernity in their spiritual 
rebellion. 
The Beats, for Podhoretz, represent moral relativism and a celebration of destructiveness. 
Podhoretz sees Kerouac as celebrating criminality, primitivism and an anti-intellectualism 
that “makes the ordinary American’s hatred of eggheads seem positively benign.” (2004: 
35) Kerouac’s enthusiastic primitivism was, for Podhoretz, inspired by the same spirit that 
drives “the young savages in leather jackets who have been running amok in the last few 
years with their switchblades and zip guns.” (2004: 39) Podhoretz sees American moral 
decline symbolised in the leather-jacketed youths that were celebrated by Kerouac. 
Decline was connected to the development of the American middle class, Podhoretz 
claims that “I happen to believe that there is a direct connection between the flabbiness of 
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middle class life and the spread of juvenile crime in the 1950s” (2004: 39). It was Kerouac‘s 
celebration of a life that refuses to engage with society that most disturbed Podhoretz. By 
rebelling against American culture and rejecting “characters who are capable of getting 
seriously involved with a woman, a job, a cause” (2004: 39) and by celebrating the use of 
drugs, promiscuity and madness the experimentation of the Beats posed a problem to 
social norms.  
In 1999 Podhoretz even went so far as to suggest that Ginsberg, in his declaration “that 
the perverse was infinitely superior to the normal”, became “homosexual not out of erotic 
compulsion but by an act of will and as another way of expressing his contempt for normal 
life” (2000: 36). In a second essay from 1958 ‘The New Nihilism and the Novel’, Podhoretz 
notes:  
…the reception accorded Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg, whose work combines an 
appearance of radicalism with a show of intense spirituality, testifies to the hunger that 
has grown up on all sides for something extreme, fervent, affirmative and sweeping. 
(1965: 163)  
Citing David Reisman’s The Lonely Crowd, Podhoretz takes the Beats as a symptom of a 
cultural malaise that developed during the 1950s due to increasing affluence and comfort. 
Referring to the nihilism of the character Sebastian Dangerfield in J. P. Donleavy’s The 
Ginger Man, Podhoretz says “he is living the truth of his times” but he is not a rebel:  
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…for there is nothing to rebel against, but he is an example of what becomes of the 
impulse toward rebellion at a moment in history when the only conventions in 
existence are anachronistic survivals of a moribund ethos. (1965: 169) 
Podhoretz recognized the international nature of rebellious bohemia stating that “it was… 
Camus who first spotted the significance of this new style of nihilism” (1965: 170). In 
Alexandre Kojeve and the roots of postmodern politics, Shadia Drury sees this nihilism 
encapsulated in the existential acte gratuite and the expression it received in Andre Gide’s 
Les Caves du Vatican (1994: 60). Gide, whose literary questions preceded those of Camus, 
describes an apparently motiveless murder where a man was pushed out of a moving 
train. The murderer, Lafcadio, had no interest in the money found in the dead man’s 
pocket; the murder was essentially gratuitous, Lafcadio was simply bored. “His acte 
gratuite was intended to separate him from the herd of humanity. Lafcadio wanted to live 
like an immortal god in the midst of mortal play things.” (Drury, 1994: 61) What Gide 
describes is fictional but for Drury, “It is certainly not foreign to those of us who live in a 
world filled with gratuitous terror and motiveless crimes directed against totally 
anonymous victims.” (1994: 61) For Drury these crimes reflect reality, “the new brand of 
criminality is motivated by boredom, a desire for adventure, and a quest for ‘pure 
prestige’” (1994: 61) 
In response to this problem Georges Bataille, who along with Camus attended Kojève’s 
lectures on Hegel, wrote to Kojève “the question arises as to whether the negativity of one 
who has ‘nothing more to do’ disappears or remains in a state of ‘unemployed negativity’” 
(1997: 296). In the post-historical state, where legal recognition and equality is given to all 
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and material affluence has provided comfort, there is nothing more to do; Bataille 
questions if this is really enough. After being granted universal recognition the human, as 
negativity, becomes unemployed, it has nothing left to do. What happens to this 
unemployed negativity is the question of the end of history because, although desire is 
declared to be satisfied, it is not; “it brings into play representations extremely charged 
with emotive value… these representations intoxicate him.” (Bataille, 1997: 298)  
Leo Strauss, who became a crucial philosophic influence on American neoconservatism, 
also attended Kojève’s lectures and undertook a long correspondence with him, echoes 
Bataille’s criticism:  
The recognition, for which great men of action strive, is admiration. That recognition is 
not necessarily satisfied by the End-State. The fact that great deeds are impossible in 
the End-State, can lead precisely the best to a nihilistic denial of the End-State.  
…..If I had more time than I have, I could state more fully, and presumably more clearly, 
why I am not convinced that the End State as you describe it, can be either the rational 
or the merely-factual satisfaction of human beings. For the sake of simplicity I refer 
today to Nietzche’s ‘‘last men”. - Letter dated 22/8/1948 (2000: 238-239) 
Both Bataille and Strauss, though offering different responses, recognized the Kojèvian 
conception of the end of history as an ultimately disappointing and unsatisfactory place. In 
connection with this, Mansfield’s understanding of manliness is that it has not entirely 
disappeared in modernity but has also become “unemployed”. Mansfield situates this 
unemployment in the rational, Hegelian state saying “the entire enterprise of modernity… 
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could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed.” (Mansfield, 2006: 230) 
This understanding of unemployment as a consequence of a rational, administrative state 
encapsulates the bohemian attitude that influenced Bataille’s own generation through 
Surrealism; it is an attitude of experimentation that appears as a rebellion but that is 
enabled by a level of material and political comfort.  
This same unemployed negativity is represented in the literature of the 1950s, it is a 
striving for something that is not there. This striving can be detected in many of Kerouac’s 
texts, from the search for “kicks” in On the Road, to the Buddhism of his time in California 
and in his return to Catholicism and descent into alcoholism. What marks Kerouac’s writing 
is the encompassing desolation as unemployed negativity searches for something to do.  
 
 
Irving Kristol – Counter-culture and capitalism 
The Beats were the precursors to elements of the counter-culture, which Podhoretz 
considered to be a “species of nihilism” and a plague that affects the “vulnerable young”. 
Podhoretz saw them as being a symptom of a culture that saw itself as satisfied, a culture 
that had nothing more to do. Irving Kristol extended Podhoretz’s critique of the developing 
cultural paradigm, especially in relation to the radical student movement of the 1960s; 
later he would detect this nihilism in capitalism itself.  
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America’s problem was one of affluence, the students saw ahead of them a comfortable 
existence, one that held no great danger and offered no opportunity for “great deeds”. 
The comfortable students desired recognition but existed within a system that offered no 
opportunities for heroism. For Bataille the response was the idea of sovereignty found 
through the act of rebellion as an end in itself, through the transgression of the rational 
society (2001: 129-132). Following the acte gratuite, the Beats shared this sense of 
rebellion (McNally, 2003: 67). Kristol calls this phenomenon an “adversary culture” which, 
as with nineteenth century bohemia, developed through education:  
When we send our sons and daughters to college, we may expect that by the time they 
are graduated they are likely to have a lower opinion of our social and economic 
order…  The more “cultivated” a person is in our society, the more disaffected and 
malcontent he is likely to be – a disaffection, moreover, directed not only at the 
actuality of our society but at the ideality… The average “less cultivated” American, of 
course feels no great uneasiness with either the actual or the ideal. (1995: 106-7)  
The adversary is someone who is framed through education and not their material 
conditions, the adversary is not opposed to the state because of the merciless exploitation 
of an economic system but, it is claimed, because they are comfortable and bored. Kristol 
saw the adversary culture not as politically programmatic but as a reaction against the 
comfort and ease of modernity.  
Kristol had elucidated his understanding of the role of culture in a 1971 essay called 
‘Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship’:  
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…if you believe that no-one was ever corrupted by a book, you have also to believe 
that no one was ever improved by a book (or a play or movie). You have to believe, in 
other words, that all art is morally trivial and that, consequently, all education is 
morally irrelevant. (1972: 32) 
Kristol, like Podhoretz in relation to the Beats, takes the opposite view; all culture is 
morally relevant. Kristol’s argument for the importance of cultural education echoes that 
Leo Strauss’s reading of Plato’s Republic (Strauss, 1964). Drawing on Walter Berns, a 
student of Strauss, Kristol says, “no society can be utterly indifferent to the ways its 
citizens publicly entertain themselves” (1972: 33). Popular culture affects the people, for 
example, cockfighting and bear baiting are wrong not because they are cruel to animals, 
but because “it was felt that they debased and brutalised the citizenry” (1972: 33). Culture 
should present and promote accepted moral conventions and not corrupt them.  
The modern spirit of nihilism was not limited to cultural and intellectual spheres, it also 
extended to the economic. In a 1973 essay ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Nihilism’, which was 
first delivered as a lecture to the Mont Pelerin Society, Kristol continues his critique of the 
New Left and the adversary culture. He begins by acknowledging the importance of 
Chicago School economics and the arguments of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman in 
attacking the planned economy. For Kristol, the traditional economics of socialism had 
been discredited but the question remained, “If the traditional economics of socialism 
have been discredited, why has not the traditional economics of capitalism been 
vindicated?” (1978: 57) The answer is to be found in the notion of “thinking economically”. 
What marked out the old Left was its serious engagement with economic thinking, with 
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the rational science of modernity and for Kristol this is where it lost the argument. The old 
Left was rational, but “the identifying mark[s] of the New Left are its refusal to think 
economically and its contempt for bourgeois society precisely because this is a society that 
does think economically” (1978: 58). Kristol defines economics and thinking economically 
as the “social science par excellence of modernity” based upon the “philosophical 
presuppositions of modernity” (1978: 58) and enlightenment rationalism. Kristol is 
referring to the turn that Leo Strauss identified in modern philosophy that moved away 
from classical notions of virtue and towards rational individualism, the quest to conquer 
nature for the sake of “comfortable self-preservation” and what Strauss saw as a moral 
levelling down (Strauss, 1989: 81-98). Following the bohemian lineage through the Beats 
(Belgrad, 2004: 30-36) and the counter-culture, the New Left was constituted as a 
rebellion against these philosophical presuppositions.  
Kristol seems to have had some sympathy with this argument. Central economic planning 
did not fail because it assumed knowledge of the good life. It failed because it assumed 
that the good life is based on material consumption, but it could not deliver on this 
promise:  
If you do not define “happiness” or “satisfaction” in this way, if you refuse to think 
“economically”, then the pre-modern view is more plausible than it is not. (1978: 58) 
And in a very revealing statement Kristol goes on: 
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…if you believe that man’s spiritual life is more important than his trivial and transient 
adventures in the market place, then you may tolerate a free market for practical 
reasons… but you certainly will have no compunction in overriding it. (1978: 59)  
Kristol’s view of capitalism is that it sees the good life, much like the old Left did, as 
material satisfaction gained through comfortable self-preservation. But for the 
neoconservatives, comfortable modernity, if possible for all, may not be satisfying in-itself. 
Allan Bloom, a student of Leo Strauss, made a similar point in his essay on Plato’s Republic, 
saying that by “denying the existence of spiritedness” (1968: 349), the modern capitalist 
system denies the value of anything that is beyond the economic. Kristol’s position here is 
that markets are useful because they produce affluence but are not an end in themselves. 
Without spiritual underpinnings the capitalist system lacks legitimacy, the very problem 
that Hayek brought to Mont Pelerin in 1947.  
Kristol’s question turns to the failings of bourgeois civilisation. Liberal capitalist society is 
of necessity also secular; the end of religion and the promise of otherworldly happiness 
meant that “the demands placed upon liberal society, in the name of temporal 
‘happiness’, have become ever more urgent and ever more unreasonable” (1978: 63). The 
lack of a promise of a better life after death necessarily turned people toward this worldly 
satisfaction. This means material satisfaction, the promise of affluence and the Straussian 
understanding of post-Lockean political modernity as “comfortable self-preservation” 
(Strauss, 1989: 89). The collapse of the religious ideal and the legitimacy that it provided 
necessarily turned people towards the material satisfaction found in consumption. 
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Consumption could not replace the old form of legitimacy and so dissatisfaction and 
counter-cultural rebellion developed.   
Kristol carries on: 
Another, and related, consequence of the disestablishment of religion as a publicly 
sanctioned mythos has been the inability of liberal society ever to come up with a 
convincing and generally accepted theory of political obligation. (1978: 64)  
Kristol considers religion as useful for the production of political obligations and a codified, 
transcendentally understood morality. In the nineteenth century the latent Christian 
influence moderated the capitalist spirit by imposing “bourgeois virtues [such] as honesty, 
sobriety, diligence and thrift” (1978: 65). But as the liberal focus on individualism 
increased, the hold of religion weakened and a purer form of liberal, capitalist logic 
developed. This was a logic that had no room for the religious life and instead focused on 
the progressive, technological satisfaction of desire. Kristol sums up his position thus, “I 
think it is becoming increasingly clear that religion, and a moral philosophy associated with 
religion, is far more important politically than the philosophy of liberal individualism 
admits.” (1978: 66)  
Religion is however only one element of the neoconservative project, the protection of 
capitalism is another, particularly in relation to the problems of nihilism and political 
stability. For Strauss, modernity is characterised by the replacement of the classical notion 
of moderation with the attempt to satisfy desire. However, because desire is not satiable 
the economy needs to constantly expand to match rising expectations. This is why 
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economic growth is so important; there will always be a desire for more and so infinite 
economic expansion becomes a vital component of modernity. The economy needs to 
expand to meet rising expectations, but:  
What is called “the revolution of rising expectations” has reached such grotesque 
dimensions that men take it as an insult when they are asked to be reasonable in their 
desires and demands. (1972: 27)  
Kristol sees capitalism as being successful in the modern world because it achieves this, in 
1978 he writes that it “does work – does promote economic growth and permit the 
individual to better his condition” but he also demonstrates his discomfort, “there is 
something joyless, even somnambulistic about this” (1995: 120). Not only is it joyless, it is 
pointless because, the “demands of material compensation gradually become as infinite as 
the infinity they have lost” (1978: 64). Once the religious impulse has given way to 
capitalism there is only the impossible fulfilment of infinite desire, yet it is 
unacknowledged as such.  
The collapse of bourgeois morality was typified by the rise of the instalment plan. In a 
1974 Kristol remarked that those buying on credit through an instalment plan were once 
considered “feckless and irresponsible” (2011: 71) but this taboo on credit no longer 
exists. Daniel Bell, a long-time friend of and collaborator with Kristol, noted in The Cultural 
Contradictions of Capitalism (1976) that this represented a “revolution in the moral habit” 
(1996: 69). This revolution was a necessary development for the capitalism of mass 
production that had developed in the first half of the twentieth century. If people insisted 
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on being thrifty and saving their money until they could afford the consumer goods, there 
would much fewer consumers and less capital exchange. A shift in moral attitudes 
regarding debt was necessary to speed up capital exchange and open the markets for 
mass-produced goods. Bell argued that this need to produce consumers for the new 
capitalism fundamentally changed the moral attitudes of the US so that “by the 1950s 
American culture had become primarily hedonistic, concerned with play, fun, display and 
pleasure… in a compulsive way” (1996: 70). The spiritual hedonism of the Beats was 
reflected in a general hedonistic consumerism. This made possible the exploration of 
identities, opened up new attitudes and produced new subjects who were willing 
experiment and mould their own identities in newly privatised spaces outside of 
traditional authority (Gammon, 2013, 522). These new attitudes in turn helped to break-
down social conventions that had held capital back from establishing new markets.  
Bell identified a fundamental problem with Kristol’s wish to return to protestant values, 
“the one thing that would utterly destroy the new capitalism is the serious practice of 
delayed gratification” (1996: 78). In other words, the return of moderation as a virtue 
would be unacceptable to a form of capitalism that relies upon the willingness of people to 
go into debt in order to consume. If people were to stop using credit, consumer demand 
would dry up. Such a collapse in demand would have a knock-on effect on production with 
catastrophic consequences for the capitalist economy. Capitalism’s need for consumerism 
is why the return to religion that neo-conservatism desires struggles to insist upon thrift as 
a value. This is one reason why the contemporary rhetoric of austerity is so contradictory, 
with markets being fearful of both over-indebtedness and a contraction in the supply of 
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credit. In 2003 Kristol’s change in attitude to credit is shown when he describes the 
neoconservative position thus:  
The cost of this emphasis on economic growth has been an attitude toward public 
finance that is far less risk-averse than is the case among more traditional 
conservatives. (2011: 191) 
Bell implies a link between the development of a consumer capitalism designed around 
immediate gratification and the counter culture of the 1960s, “It was an effort, largely a 
product of the youth movement, to transform a liberal lifestyle into a world of immediate 
gratification and exhibitionistic display.” (1996: 81) The development of mass production 
necessitated a shift in the moral norms of society, an ideology of thrift was no longer 
commensurate with production and liberalisation was needed. Liberalisation in the habits 
of buying implied liberalisation in other forms of behaviour and social attitudes that 
produced “women’s libbers, sexual nonconformists and cultural radicals” (1996: 78).  
The experimentation of bohemia is mirrored by “the spirit of perpetual innovation” (Bell, 
1996: 78) of consumer capitalism. Consumer capitalism goes hand in hand with cultural 
experimentation, particularly regarding identity, but “the curious fact is that the ‘new 
capitalism’ of abundance has never been able to define its view of these cultural-political 
issues.” (Bell, 1996: 78) Capitalism is ambivalent about these issues, cultural shifts merely 
open up new markets. The social liberalism of the counter-culture allows the development 
of the market liberalism of consumer capitalism and vice versa.  
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Bell claimed that this liberalisation of culture meant that, “the corporate class had 
abdicated” (1996: 79) from its responsibility to moralise the working class. This is a view 
shared by Kristol who defined republican virtue as “curbing one’s passions and moderating 
one’s opinions in order to achieve a large consensus that will ensure domestic 
tranquillity… a form of self-control, an exercise in self-government.” (2011: 68) For Bell, “it 
was the American businessman who first liberated himself from the idea of ‘republican 
virtue’” (1996: 70). Republican virtue was sacrificed for the profit motive when the modern 
businessman rejected the connection between his vocation and moral character. Kristol 
points out that “it was thought to be dishonourable for a businessman to go bankrupt, not 
because this was a sign of failure but because it meant that he was cheating his creditors 
who trusted him.” (2011: 70) Such behaviour, it is implied, is no longer the case.  
The ambivalent attitude of the new capitalism is evident in the apparent support that it 
gives to the counter-culture through the music industry, cinema, clothes and lifestyles. 
This process has been noted by Left intellectuals as a process of recuperation, where 
capitalism takes something that is organic and potentially threatening, re-packages it and 
then sells that feeling of kicking against the system back to the potential rebel. Kristol 
mocks the Left for sometimes making this process sound like a grand conspiracy, but his 
line is in some ways more radical: 
Our capitalists promote the ethos of the New Left for only one reason: they cannot 
think of any reason why they should not. For them it is “business as usual” (1978: 67).  
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Bourgeois virtue has been replaced by individual liberty, this liberty is both economic and 
social; modernity produces the two symbiotically so it becomes accurate to say that 
capitalism is counter-culture. The new capitalism needs a counter-culture that expands 
horizons and seeks out new possibilities, it needs an ideology that is focused on expression 
and the development of the self because any development in the social and the breaking 
down of any taboo establishes fresh markets. Neoliberal hyper-consumption and the post-
war counter-culture share an ideology of personal expression and freedom and a have an 
aversion to centralised control. This symbiotic relationship is something that has been 
documented by Thomas Frank in The Conquest of Cool through management literature and 
the development of marketing. Capitalism captured social aspects of the counter-culture, 
particularly the emphasis on youth and free expression, whilst disarming its political edge.  
Worried about the consequences of capitalist excesses, rising executive pay and economic 
instability Kristol warned that this behaviour was damaging to the social whole. In 1970 he 
explains that a society that places freedom over virtue is “severed from its moral 
moorings”. Criticising Hayek and Milton Friedman he asks, “can men live in a free society if 
they have no reason to believe it is also a just society? I do not think so” (1972: 97). For 
Kristol, the mere opportunity to express oneself in the market, both economically and 
socially is not enough if one is at the sharp edge of capitalist practice and at the mercy of 
fortune in Hayek’s game of catallaxy.  
Kristol perceived the problems of capitalism, both in terms of the ambivalence to changing 
moral orders and about economic injustice and mismanagement. The two problems feed 
into each other and Kristol worried that if the economic promise of capitalism failed, the 
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erosion of morality would leave the system without a convincing narrative with which to 
legitimise itself. However, because of his opposition to bohemia and his wish to re-
establish bourgeois codes of behaviour Kristol was, despite his awareness of the need, 
unable to imagine a new mode of morality compatible with the developing economic 
paradigm of the second half of the 1970s. The question that Kristol failed to resolve was of 
how retain a universal moral order and the individual capitalist subject freely acting in the 
market.  
 
The Capitalist as Hero and a New Moral Paradigm 
The new capitalism had failed to produce a new moral paradigm. Kristol poses the 
problem in 1974:  
Who wants to live in a society in which selfishness and self-seeking are celebrated as 
primary virtues [?]… So if capitalism is what this indictment claims it is – if it is what so 
many businessmen today seem to think it is – then it is doomed, and properly. (1978: 
85)  
Capitalism is doomed because it is perceived as a celebration of selfishness for its own 
sake. Kristol turns to the work of Horatio Alger, the nineteenth century American novelist 
famous for fictional representations of the rise, through hard work and thrift, of the poor 
to middle class respectability. For Kristol, Alger’s novels are “the only substantial body of 
American literature where businessmen are heroes rather than villains” (1978: 86). But, as 
Kristol explains, these characters are not heroic because they simply pursue the profit 
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motive, “instead one finds a moral conception of business as an honourable vocation for 
honourable men” (1978: 86). 
Kristol was unable to escape the cultural logic capitalism. He perceived the collapse of the 
bourgeois moral paradigm but was only able to offer paeans to the dead protestant ethic. 
Does this mean that the neoconservative moral critique runs into a dead end? Is it 
incapable of overcoming the contradiction between liberalisation (both economic and 
cultural), traditional authority and political order? This is where commentators make the 
turn towards foreign policy. It is argued that the realm of foreign policy offered the 
neoconservatives a sphere in which to recreate a black and white moral order which could 
counteract the abyss of modernity. Drolet is quite specific, “For the neoconservative, 
foreign policy is a prime site for the cultivation of forms of subjectivity and citizenship 
which are… resistant to the ‘cultural contradiction of capitalism’” (Drolet, 2007; 273) I do 
not disagree with these accounts. However, a focus on the moral valence of foreign policy 
in neoconservative thought can lead to a forgetfulness regarding the moral economy of 
neoliberalism. It is not so simple as to suggest that a morally infused foreign policy masked 
a moral abyss in capitalism. Though neoconservatives did recognise the importance of 
foreign policy in the domestic moral economy (Kristol and Kagan, 1996) others attempted 
to overcome the impasse in moral thought that was reached by Irving Kristol. It is 
particularly relevant to draw attention to this narrative in light of global financial crisis that 
began in 2007. The important question regards how neoliberalism has survived? The 
question has relevance for those interested in neoconservatism because this period of 
time has corresponded with the neoconservatives, especially in foreign policy terms, being 
broadly side-lined and in which the binary rhetoric of the war on terror has diminished. It 
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cannot be said that that a foreign policy distraction has made up for capitalism’s moral 
abyss during a time of financial crisis. To answer the question of neoliberalism’s survival 
Philip Mirowski has detailed the intellectual capture of what he calls the “neoliberal 
thought collective” in university economics departments and throughout the political 
system. Mirowski goes someway in explaining the hegemony of neoliberal reason but he 
does not answer the moral question that I began this paper with. As Hayek noted and as 
Kristol and Bell detailed, the liberal capitalist project has undermined both classical and 
bourgeois morality. To better understand the survival of neoliberalism we must instead 
develop an understanding of its moral economy. 
In Wealth and Poverty George Gilder takes Kristol’s problematic as his starting point and 
reiterates the question “Can men live in a free society if they have no reason to believe it is 
also a just society?” (Gilder, 1981: 6) Capitalism lacks a “transcendent justification” and is 
wounded by “moral contradictions deriving from its continuing practical failures” (1981: 
4). “Practical failure” is here acting as a euphemism for financial crisis. Gilder’s motivating 
question is how to maintain the appearance of a capitalist morality given the apparent 
inequality of the system. In other words, the presence of practical failures (crises) 
questions the legitimacy of the system and so capitalism needs to produce a narrative to 
justify this risk and to explain away inequality and the spectre of destitution. Gilder 
repeats Kristol’s criticisms of Hayek and Friedman, accusing them of being “technical and 
pragmatic”. Freedom is considered good because it makes people rich and wealth is the 
only measure of success, but “None of these writers sees reason to give capitalism a 
theology or even assign to its results any assurance of justice.” (1981: 6) Gilder’s project in 
the early 1980s was one of reshaping the capitalist moral paradigm, to produce for it a 
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theology that justified and explained inequality whilst disrupting the middle-class 
flabbiness that Kristol and Podhoretz saw in the counter-culture. 
For Gilder “Capitalism begins with giving” and from this he attempted to produce a 
justification of capitalism on anthropological grounds via the idea of potlatch. Potlatch, 
where the primitive economy is based on the gift, is here presented as the primitive form 
of capitalism. Borrowing from the work of Melville Herskovits, Mervin Harris, Marcel 
Mauss and Claude Levi-Strauss, Gilder tells us “the capitalists of primitive society were 
tribal leaders who vied with one another in giving great feasts” (1981: 21). One leader 
would put on a feast and invite another tribe in the hope of an eventual return. The 
receiver of the gift, and this is the point emphasised by Mauss, is symbolically obligated to 
return a gift to the giver. In this instance the return is via another feast, but with one 
crucial difference, the gift must be returned with interest. To return a lesser gift, or worse, 
no gift at all, places the initial receiver of the gift in a symbolically less prestigious position 
to the giver; to not return a gift is shameful.  
Potlatch is presented as a successful form of exchange because “these competitions in 
giving are contests of altruism. A gift will only elicit a greater response if it is based on an 
understanding of the needs of others.” (Gilder, 1981: 22) However, this formulation of the 
potlatch is at odds with some other interpretations where it is the value of the gift to the 
giver that bestows power to the gift and not the use-value to the receiver (Mauss, 1950: 
ch. one; Bataille, 1991: ch. one; Baudrillard, 1993: 131-143). For Gilder the value of the gift 
is defined by its use-value to the receiver; if the gift is of no use to the receiver it cannot be 
symbolically more prestigious. By presenting it in this way Gilder cuts out the aspect of the 
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gift where its prestige is based on the sacrifice of the giver, with the ultimate gift, one that 
cannot be returned, being the life of the giver. For Gilder, a gift that is unwanted contains 
no symbolic power in spite of any value that it may have for the giver.  
In the way that Gilder reads the gift, the giver has to consider the needs and desires of the 
receiver, he has to anticipate these, so, “the contest of the gifts leads to an expansion of 
human sympathies” (1981: 22). Gilder’s gift is productive not destructive. This supply-side 
version of potlatch implies that the giver makes an investment (the gift), in the hope that 
he will, in time, receive a return in either material wealth, by being given back a more 
valuable gift than the one given, or in prestige. Gilder’s gift is entirely instrumental. 
One invests in a company in the hope of a return at some future date, but this return 
remains unknown, it is always a risk. If a return is made, the investment will have been 
well received and the product will have been a success. If the investor makes a loss, s/he 
will have to absorb it, but the lesson learned may still lead to a good for someone else at a 
future date. The problem with the capitalism is when this material loss is made and there 
is not a corresponding increase in prestige. For Gilder, entrepreneurs “contribute more to 
society than they ever recover, and most of them win no riches at all. They are the heroes 
of economic life” (1981: 245). What Gilder was aiming to achieve was a reversal of this 
lack, he wanted to establish the prestige of business via heroic investment.  
Gilder attempts to re-moralise capitalism through the celebration of entrepreneurs as 
heroes. Gilder celebrates the gift giving of the capitalist investor as the person who, by 
supplying something, creates demand. The new products and services are the capitalist’s 
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gifts, but because a return is not guaranteed the capitalist must be willing to take the risk, 
s/he therefore becomes morally more prestigious. Gilder’s economics is based on the 
expansion of consumer desire and not moderation. He inverts the problems of modernity 
as perceived by Kristol and attempts to insert a moral paradigm at the exact point where 
Kristol and Bell could only see the collapse of one.  
The risk element also produces the spiritual factor: 
For entrepreneurial experiments are also adventures, with the future livelihood of the 
investor at stake. He participates with a heightened consciousness and passion and an 
alertness and diligence that greatly enhance his experience. (1981: 25)  
This risk taking produces the excitement that is lacking in post-historical culture, as 
Mirowski says “This is one reason that participation in neoliberal life necessitates acting as 
an entrepreneur of the self: unreserved embrace of (this version of risk) is postulated to be 
the primary method of changing your identity to live your life to the fullest.” (Mirowski, 
2013: 119). Gilder’s economics is that of the master, it celebrates those who take risks as 
heroes whilst those too fearful to risk anything are forgotten. This was also the argument 
that Francis Fukuyama reiterated in his End of History and the Last Man, the primordial 
battle for pure prestige that Kojève described in his reading of Hegel is re-imagined as a 
field of entrepreneurial investment, “they do not risk their lives, but they stake their 
fortunes, status, and reputations” (Fukuyama, 1992: 316). What Gilder did in his best-
selling book, which was a favourite of Ronald Reagan, was to redefine the moral paradigm 
of capitalism; bourgeois virtues are abandoned and the willingness to take risk and 
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embrace fortuna and Hayek’s game of catallaxy are presented as the new moral 
benchmark.  
The problem of nihilism in the new capitalism is thus solved by redefining that nihilism as 
virtue, what was problematic for Kristol becomes glorious for Gilder and the presence of 
extreme wealth turns into a sign of prestige and moral worth. The rich are so because of 
the moral superiority of the “wealth creator”. On a policy level this leads Gilder to a 
rejection of the social democratic welfare model as this merely protects and encourages a 
slave morality. Investors should be let free and encouraged to take risks, the poor, instead 
of being animalised by state hand-outs should be given a legalistic framework that 
encourages them to become risk-taking entrepreneurs. The neoliberal triptych of 
deregulation, free markets and low taxes was thus given a moral basis. Not only will 
investors experience the “heightened consciousness” of risk-taking but society should also 
celebrate those risk-takers as its paradigmatic heroes. Indeed, this is what begins to be 
represented in the 1980s in notable films such as Trading Places (1983) Risky Business 
(1983), Wall Street (1987) and Working Girl (1988). These films all celebrate the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the characters but unlike Horatio Alger, who presented the 
business man as honourable, these representations celebrate risk-taking and 
experimentation. The “heightened consciousness” of the entrepreneur is celebrated and 
capitalism is shown as a spiritual practice. 
The slave is re-imagined as the person who is too afraid to be an entrepreneur and is 
pathetically satisfied with working for another. Worse than employee are those who rely 
on state for financial support. Welfare is the centre of the Nietzschean slave revolt 
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because, “Socialism is an insurance policy bought by all the members of a national 
economy to shield them from risk.” (Gilder, 1981: 26) The poor are so because they are 
afraid of taking risks and being entrepreneurial. Ideas of institutional inequality are 
rejected as wealth and poverty become a reflection of one’s moral worth. Gilder and other 
neoconservatives like Gertrude Himmelfarb argued that the attempt to help the poor 
through welfare created a trap, government spending is therefore accused of being 
immoral. Such arguments have remained intrinsic to debates around welfare during 
contemporary austerity where the poor should be set free and re-moralised by exposing 
them to a precarious life on the edge.  
Gilder’s moral economy is however split and necessarily so because of how he imagines 
the investor, “their chief desire is not money to waste on consumption” (Gilder, 2012: 
254). The entrepreneur is thrifty, s/he saves money and does not consume unnecessarily. 
But if the entrepreneur does not consume where does demand come from? Within the 
moral economy there is a hierarchy between the expenditure of the risk-taking 
entrepreneur and the expenditure of the consumer. One who is moral and one who is not, 
one who is careful yet embraces risk and another who is feckless but fearful.  Gilder’s 
rejection of conspicuous consumption as vulgar and his insistence that the entrepreneurial 
rich are frugal reveals the contradiction in neoliberalism’s utopian vision.  Neoliberalism 
both demands consumption and the creation of credit yet still castigates non-productive 
expenditure.  
The moral economy of the gift that Gilder attempts to establish is based on what he 
perceives as the generosity of the entrepreneur, however, following Derrida’s analysis of 
the gift in Given Time (1992) it is not certain that it should be taken it as such. Following 
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Mauss, Gilder insists upon the reciprocal nature of the gift but for Derrida “for there to be 
a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counter gift or debt” (Derrida, 1992: 
12). Furthermore, the gift should not appear as a gift either to the giver or the receiver. If 
there is such an acknowledgement of the gift then symbolic recognition is taken, which is a 
form of return. What Mauss described, and Gilder adopted, was a form of exchange based 
on reciprocity and not gift giving. Gilder was correct to rename these as “investments” but 
he produced a sleight of hand when he implied that these were generous. The logic of 
neoliberalism always seeks a return.  
What Gilder imagines is a moral economy of debt based on an excess of giving rather than 
moderation, where the entrepreneur demands moral prestige because of the risk-taking 
venture. The ‘gifts’ of consumer goods, a growing economy and employment are for Gilder 
augmented by something more important, the gift of knowledge. In the recently rewritten 
edition of Wealth and Poverty (2012) he states that “every capitalist investment has the 
potential for a dual yield: a financial profit and an epistemological profit” (Gilder, 2012: 
274). This is reiterated more thoroughly in the recent Knowledge and Power (2013) where 
Gilder stresses that entrepreneurs are also the creators of knowledge through their 
experiments in ‘giving’.  
Entrepreneurial experimentation is given a religious underpinning through a faith in a 
better future. Religious beliefs, “bear in their symbolic depths the greatest of pragmatic 
and historical truths. They tell us that free humans with faith in the future and a 
commitment to it will prevail.” (Gilder, 1981:258) Rationalism and the enlightenment 
tradition are rejected for “excluding chance and novelty” (Gilder, 1981: 263). It is only by 
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embracing creativity, and overcoming fear of the unknown that transcendence can be 
found (Gilder, 1981: 263) and the key to transcendence is a minimal State. The minimal 
state is not only seen as helping to produce a richer economy and more freedom (as in 
Hayek or Friedman) but is also key to the establishment of an economic culture that gives 
access to the divine. Capitalism is not just an economic system but a theology, or in Walter 
Benjamin’s terms a cult (Dodd, 2012). This cult is based on risk, a faith in one’s creativity, 
acceptance of chance and the production of debt. Gilder’s imagination of the capitalist 
hero mirrors the bohemian critique of the staid and safe bourgeois world where security 
was prioritised over pleasure and excess. For Gilder however, it is the entrepreneur who is 
the rebel, or, in effect, the bohemian is co-opted into the capitalist economy through the 
valorisation of the will to step outside convention. Gilder builds an ideology in which the 
entrepreneur is the outsider who creates new modes and orders, this seems to invert the 
moral abyss of modernity by turning that nihilism into a seductive form of Nietzschean 
capitalism.  
This aspect of Gilder’s formulation of the moral economy of capitalism has been developed 
by Jean-Joseph Goux in relation to Georges Bataille. Goux notes the similarity of Gilder’s 
capitalism with Bataille’s “notion of expenditure”, expenditure is the locus of the sacred, it 
is the wilful waste of that which remains. In Bataille’s studies expenditure often appears in 
a specifically spiritual guise such as Tibetan Lamism or the Christian mystical traditions. For 
Bataille, bourgeois capitalism gives no outlet for expenditure. As Goux notes, part of 
Bataille’s involvement with the surrealists was a bohemian urge to subvert this order 
Goux, 1990: 209). This disruption of bourgeois rationality is what is at stake in Gilder, Goux 
is worth quoting at length:  
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it is precisely at the moment when the entrepreneur must think himself into the model 
of the most advanced artistic genius, at the moment when the avant-gardist strategy of 
innovation at any price becomes the paradigm of dominant economic practice, that the 
artistic avant-garde necessarily loses its difference, its marginality, its deviance-value. 
The aesthetic avant- gardes have won… it becomes more difficult for the poet to 
distinguish himself from the grocer, more difficult for the surrealist to differentiate 
himself from the dishevelled manager. (Goux, 1990: 219) 
Capitalism encourages the risk taking element in human nature, “reason and calculation, 
for all their appeal, can never suffice” (1981: 27). Government is problematic because it 
tends toward the minimisation of risk for what is perceived as the benefit of all.  However, 
there is a rationality of accumulation behind Gilder’s celebration of risk, for without risk an 
economic system (and in Gilder’s mind, society as well) will amortise and capital 
accumulation will cease:  
...waste and irrationality is the secret of economic growth… a society ruled by risk and 
freedom rather than by rational calculus, a society open to the future rather than 
planning it, can call forth an endless stream of invention. (1981: 252)  
The irrational, held back by bourgeois morality, needs to be set free: 
…in order to take the hill, someone must dare first to charge the enemy bunker. 
Heroism, willingness to plunge into the unknown, in the hope that others will follow, is 




Conclusion: Bohemia and the Moral Economy of Neoliberalism 
If modernity was characterised by the apparent triumph of rationalism, Gilder’s post-
modern capitalism embraces fortuna, “Chance, however, is not the realm of the anarchic 
and haphazard but the area of freedom and the condition of creativity. It taps the 
underlying and transcendent order of the universe.” (Gilder, 1981: 254) Gilder maintained 
and reiterated this position in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. He even went as far 
as to castigate the economics profession for its penchant for complex, though floored, 
models, “Austrian and Keynesian – both sides share an essential vision. They see their 
discipline as successful insofar as it eliminates surprise.” (Gilder, 2013: 3), what animates 
economic modelling is the avoidance of chance and not its embrace. For Gilder, it is the 
need for this comfort that exacerbated the crisis.  
Gilder describes the “willingness to face danger and fight” (Gilder, 2013: 283) as the 
defining motif of capitalism and calls it “an economics of disequilibrium and disruption” 
(Gilder, 2013: 5).  This emphasis on the satisfaction of the risk-taking entrepreneur is 
consistent with sociological theories of the risk, particularly regarding edgework. Edgework 
is used to describe activities that put one’s physical and mental well-being outside of 
ordered reality. The need for risk, specifically the embracing of chance and the testing of 
one’s clarity of mind amid uncertainty, constitutes the satisfaction of edgework. Be it 
skydiving, gambling, drug-taking and binge drinking, identity experimentation or 
entrepreneurialism, it this sense of the edge and the overcoming of social boundaries that 
connects these activities (see Arnoldi, 2009: 138-152; and Lupton, 2013: 213-221). This 
emphasis on risk can be given further depth if we consider Alexandre Kojève’s reading of 
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Hegel’s master/slave dialectic which emphasised the importance of risk taking for human 
recognition. In the struggle for life and death the two subjects recognise each other as 
something that is willing to risk its own life for the sake of recognition. It is recognised by 
the other as something willing to do so and is therefore worthy of recognition. Gilder is, 
unknown to him, appealing to such a notion in his attempt legitimise capitalism. However, 
the risk must be genuine and it is unclear whether this is so in capitalism. The economist 
Thomas Picketty has noted that “Capital is never quiet: it is always risk oriented and 
entrepreneurial, at least at its inception, yet it always tends to transform itself into rents 
as it accumulates in large enough amounts – that is its vocation, its logical destination” 
(Picketty, 2014: 115-116). Capital seeks the safest way expand itself, sometimes risk is 
involved but if a safer option is available, for example through rent-seeking, it will take 
that. This duel aspect of capitalist risk has been highlighted by Jonathon Levy. In the 
nineteenth century classical liberalism offered “a vision of freedom that linked the liberal 
idea of self-ownership to the personal assumption of ‘risk’” (Levy, 2013: 5) but, at the 
same time there developed the corporate financial system that sought to insure against 
that risk. Capital is rational, not irrational as Gilder claims. Gilder attempts to make it 
appear as the latter to establish for it a moral economy that replaces the traditional 
authority, based on moderation, which has been eroded in modernity. But it is, as Goux 
says, “only a legitimation” (Goux, 1990: 216). Ultimately, Gilder’s valorisation of capital is a 
misrepresentation, the risk is not taken as an end in itself and is avoided when possible. 
This is not to say that an individual cannot existentially validate himself through capitalist 
risk, but that Gilder’s model is cannot be representative of the system. The post-crash era 
revealed the financial system as in fact a risk avoidance system that failed. The celebrated 
heroes of capitalism were shown to have not undertaken any risk on their own part and 
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have suffered few personal losses. Through austerity and programmes of quantitative 
easing the losses have been socialised. The stripping of the pretence of risk has 
undermined the legitimacy of part of the system, but not its entirety.  
It is through risk and edgework of entrepreneurialisation that the seductive legitimation of 
neoliberalism can be understood and why, for Wilson, “we have reached the point at 
which virtually the whole of metropolitan mass culture is bohemianized” (Wilson, 1999: 
20). Bohemia constituted a reaction against the rationalisation of space and the lived 
experience. In the US the Beats and the subsequent counter-culture provided a response 
to the Fordist rigidities of everyday life (Lloyd, 2010: 63). Though at the time appearing as 
a threat to capitalism, the desire for experimentation, cultural liberation, creativity and 
flexibility became the perfect solution for the problems that had developed in the Fordist 
economy by the mid-1970s. As consumers the bohemian, whose identity is homeless and 
“artificial through and through” (Cottom, 2013: 11) appears as a blank slate ready to be 
defined through lifestyle rather than class, race, gender or nation. But equally important is 
the field of work. The bohemian life, artistic and creative but insecure and flexible is better 
adapted to the work of neoliberal capitalism than the organisation men of the post-war 
period. For Lloyd: 
In addition to requiring that workers acclimate themselves to greater flexibility, with 
volatile compensation and irregular work schedules, the flexible workplace makes 
increasing demands on the individual’s creative capacity, even in mundane service 
sector jobs… they must also be able to acclimate themselves to enormous amounts of 
uncertainty and risk. (Lloyd, 2010: 244) 
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The valorised neoliberal subject, the new “creative class”, is one who is adapted to and 
embraces this new climate of risk and uncertainty (Peck, 2005). A choice for the 
bohemian, this form of insecurity is now accepted practice across the whole of the 
neoliberal economy, producing what Guy Standing has dubbed “The Precariat” 
(Standing, 2011). The entrepreneurialised bohemia of neoliberalism is neatly seen in a 
website like PeoplePerHour on which businesses can advertise for hourly workers. Those 
seeking work can set their own hourly rate, thus encouraging a race to the bottom and 
receive no security. The founder of PeoplePerHour, Xenios Thrasyvoulou, matches a 
bohemian aesthetic with a moral claim that “traditional employment… made people 
lazy” whereas flexible, insecure employment “keeps you on your toes” (interviewed in 
Peretti, 2015). Whilst offering a few the ability to tailor their working day around other 
activities, flexibility for many means zero hour contracts, or enforced self-employment. 
‘Portfolio’ careers and co-working may benefit those working in well-paid, highly 
specialised industries, but the reality for most is a series of fixed-term, low-paid jobs in 
relatively unskilled positions in a life that could not be described as “comfortable” or 
“flabby”.  
Neoliberalism survives and thrives not only because of the intellectual capture that 
Mirowski describes and the side-lining of heterodox economics outlined by Keen but 
because it has reshaped culture. When capital was eagerly exploiting the changed social 
conditions of twentieth century neoliberals recognised the need that capitalism had of a 
legitimising discourse beyond the mere creation of wealth, this morality was found in the 
process of atomisation through which capitalism eroded community. Neoliberalism is not 
simply reducible to economics, this is what Hayek, Kristol and Gilder recognised, it 
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contains within it a moral economy based on the willingness to experiment, to take risk 
and embrace the vagaries of chance.  
The flexible economy that replaced Fordism required a flexible workforce and this needed 
a change in attitude for the whole and not just the bohemian few. “Comfortable self-
preservation”, that for Strauss characterised modernity, is replaced by precariousness. This 
state of being reduces organised labour power and makes production more efficient, but 
crucially for neoliberalism, it contains within it a moral claim that should not be forgotten 
or underestimated. This flexible, insecure state is seen as lifting unemployed negativity out 
of modernity’s abyss. Precariousness and the universalisation of entrepreneurialism 
elevate the neoliberal subject from the vegetative existence of comfortable satisfaction 
and introduces risk to all. The homeless flexibility of neoliberalism experiments with ways 
of being, it establishes identities and breaks-down taboos.  The neoliberal counter-culture 
seduces through the ‘gift’ of undogmatic freedom, the possibility of joy through creativity 






Arnoldi, Jakob (2009). Risk. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Bataille, Georges. 1991. The Accursed Share. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Zone 
Books. 
Bataille, Georges. 1997. The Bataille Reader. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson (eds.). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Bataille, Georges. 2001. The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge. Trans. Stuart Kendall 
and Michelle Kendall. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Baudrillard, Jean. 1993. Symbolic Exchange and Death. Trans.Iain Hamilton Grant. London: 
Sage. 
Belgrad, Daniel. (2004) ‘The Transnational Counterculture: Beat-Mexican Intersections’. In 
Reconstructing the Beats. Jennie Skerl (ed). New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Bell, Daniel. 1996. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. United States of America: 
Basic Books. 
Bloom, Allan. 1968. The Republic of Plato. United State of America: Basic Books. 
Bloom, Allan. 1988. The Closing of the American Mind. United States of America: 
Touchstone. 
Cottom, Daniel (2013). International Bohemia: Scenes of Nineteenth-Century Life. 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Derrida, Jacques (1992). Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Dodd, Nigel (2010). ‘Nietzsche’s Money’. In Journal of Classical Sociology. Volume 13(1): 
47-68. SAGE Publications.  
Drolet, Jean-François (2007) 'The Visible Hand of Neoconservative Capitalism'. In 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, Vol 2, 245-278. 
Drolet, Jean-François (2013). American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a 
Reactionary Idealism. London: Oxford University Press 
Drury, Shadia. 1994. Alexandre Kojève and the Roots of Post Modern Politics. New York: St 
Martin’s Press. 
Frank, Thomas. 1997. The Conquest of Cool. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
41 
 
Gammon, Earl. (2013). ‘The Psycho and Sociogenesis of Neoliberalism’ In Critical Sociology. 
Volume 39(4) 511- 528 
Gilder, George (1986). Men and Marriage. USA: Pelican Publishing Company 
Gilder, George (2012). Wealth and Poverty: A New Edition for the Twenty-First Century. 
Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.  
Gilder, George (2013). Knowledge and Power: The Information Theory of Capitalism and 
How it is Revolutionizing Our World. Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 
Gilder, George. 1981. Wealth and Poverty. New York: Basic Books 
Goux, Jean-Joseph (1990). ‘General Economies and Postmodern Capitalism’. In Yale French 
Studies, No. 78, 206-224 
Haper, Stefan and Clarke, Jonathan (2004). America Alone: The Neoconservative and the 
New Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. London: Verso 
Hayek, F.A. (1982). Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles 
of Justice and Political Economy Volume Two. London: Routledge 
Hayek, F.A. (2011) The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Himmelfarb, Gertrude. (1995) The Demoralisation of Society: Form Victorian Virtues to 
Modern Values. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.  
Hirst, Aggie (2012). ‘Leo Strauss and International Relations: The Politics of Modernity’s 
Abyss’. In International Politics, Vol 49, No. 6, 645-670 
Holton, Robert. (2004) ‘”The Sordid Hipsters of America”: Beat Culture and the Folds of 
Heterogeneity’. In Reconstructing the Beats. Jennie Skerl (ed). New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan.  
Homolar, Alexandra (2010). ‘Neoconservatism and the Strauss Connection’. In The Legacy 
of Leo Strauss. Edited by Tony Burns and James Conolly. UK: Academic Imprint 
Keen, Steve (2011). Debunking Economics – Revised, Expanded and Integrated Edition: The 
Naked Emperor Dethroned. London: Zed Books. 
Kojève, Alexandre. 1980. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans. Nicols, James H. 
United States of America: Cornell University Press. 
Kristol, Irving. 1972. On the Democratic Ideal in America. United States of America: Harper 
and Row.  
42 
 
Kristol, Irving. 1978. Two Cheers for Capitalism. United States of America: Basic Books 
Kristol, Irving. 1995. Neoconservatism: the autobiography of an idea. United States of 
America: The Free Press. 
Kristol, Irving. 2011. The Neoconservative Persuasion. Gertrude Himmelfarb (ed.). New 
York: Basic Books. 
Kristol, William and Kagan, Robert (1996). ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’. In  
Foreign Affairs, Vol 75, No, 4 
Levy, Jonathan (2012). Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in 
America. USA: Harvard University Press 
Lloyd, Richard (2006). Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Post-industrial City (Second 
Edition). New York: Routledge.   
Lupton, Deborah (2013). Risk (Second Edition). Abingdon: Routledge. 
Mansfield, Harvey (2006). Manliness. USA: Yale University Press 
Mauss, Marcel. 2002. The Gift. London: Routledge. 
McNally, Dennis. (2003) Desolate Angel: Jack Kerouac, the Beat Generation, and America. 
First Da Capo Press. 
Mirowski, Philip. 2013. Never Let A Serious Crisis Go To Waste. London: Verso  
Peck, Jamie (2005). ‘Struggling with the Creative Class’. In International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, Vol. 29 No. 4, 740-770  
Peck, Jamie (2010). Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Peretti, Jacques (2015) The Super Rich and Us, episode two. BBC Television 
Picketty, Thomas (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. USA: Harvard University Press 
Podhoretz, Norman. 1965. Doings and Undoings: the fifties and in American writing. 
London: Hart-Davis. 
Podhoretz, Norman. 1967. Making It. New York: Random House. 
Podhoretz, Norman. 1980. The Present Danger. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Podhoretz, Norman. 1982. Why We Were in Vietnam. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Podhoretz, Norman. 2000. Ex Friends. New York: Encounter Books. 
43 
 
Podhoretz, Norman. 2004. The Norman Podhoretz Reader. United States of America: the 
Free Press. 
Standing, Guy. (2011) The Precariat. London: Bloomsbury Academic 
Stelzer Irwin (2004). ‘Neoconservative Economic Policy: Virtues and Vices’. In The Neocon 
Reader. Edited by Irwin Stelzer. USA: Atlantic Books.  
Strauss, Leo.  1989. An Introduction to Political Philosophy: ten essays by Leo Strauss. Hilail 
Gilden (ed.). United States of America: Wayne State University Press. 
Strauss, Leo. (1952) Persecution and the Art of Writing. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980 
Strauss, Leo. 1964. The City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Strauss, Leo. 2000. On Tyranny: including the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence. Victor 
Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wilson, Elizabeth (1999). ‘The Bohemianization of Mass Culture’. In International Journal 
of Cultural Studies. Volume 2(1): 11-32. SAGE publications.  
 
